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STABILIZATION OF COMMODITY PRICES AND
EXPORT EARNINGS: THE COFFEE
AND SUGAR AGREEMENTS
Louis M. Goreux*
Coffee and sugar are a major source of foreign exchange earnings for
many countries of the Caribbean Basin which are concerned with the
wide price fluctuations of these two products. During the post-war period,
several international commodity agreements aiming at stabilizing the
prices of coffee and sugar were made, but they failed to moderate the
sharp price increases which occurred for sugar in 1974 and for coffee in
1976-77. A new International Sugar Agreement was negotiated in
October 1977 after sugar prices fell from fifty-five cents per pound in
November 1974 to about seven cents, and serious thought is now given to
the revision of the International Coffee Agreement.
The first section of this paper reviews the price history of coffee and
sugar. The second part draws a parallel between national and interna-
tional measures of price stabilization. The third and fourth sections deal,
respectively, with export quotas and buffer stocks. Finally, the last part
shows the need for stabilizing both earnings and prices. The importance
of coffee and sugar for the countries of the Caribbean Basin is illustrated
statistically in the Annex.
PRICE FLUCTUATIONS
The depression of the 1930s followed by the closure of many export
outlets during World War II kept coffee prices and new coffee plantings at
very low levels from 1930-1945. For that reason, world coffee production
was no greater in 1950 than in 1930. With the rapid European post-war
recovery, demand for coffee outstripped supplies by the early 1950s; the
coffee surplus was replaced by a coffee shortage and prices sky-rocketed
in 1954 after it became clear that the Brazilian crop had been seriously
damaged by the frost. High prices from 1950 to 1957 stimulated coffee
plantings which consequently led to a surplus situation and low prices
from 1960 to 1974. This period of low prices discouraged investments and,
in turn, paved the way for the price explosion of 1976-77 which followed
the frost of 1975 in Brazil.
Fluctuations of sugar prices on the free market were even wider than
those of coffee because of the residual character of the free sugar market.'
* Assistant Director, Research Department, IMF.
1. Seventy percent of world coffee production is internationally traded. Only
one-quarter of world sugar production is internationally traded and only one-
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As the price of sugar on this market remained below production costs
during the second part of the 1960s, investment in the sugar industry was
discouraged and this led to the 1974-75 sugar shortage. In turn, the peak
prices of 1974-75 induced exporters and importers alike to boost their
sugar production capacities and this led to the present surplus situation.
INTERNATIONAL VERSUS NATIONAL PRICE STABILIZATION
With the elasticity of demand for sugar and coffee in relation to prices
being low, a small increase in the volume of world exportable supplies
induces a price decline which, percentage-wise, is much greater. Since the
increment in the volume of exports is more than offset by the price
decline, a large volume of exports leads to a low level of export earnings.
The fact that farmers' incomes go down when their harvest is plentiful
and that farmers' incomes can be restored by restricting supply is not
new; it has been known since the seventeenth century as the Law of
Gregory King.
Today, farmers in industrialized countries are protected, at least to
some extent, against the vagaries of the market. Such protection results
in some cases from government intervention when the prices of certain
commodities fall below an agreed floor price and, in other cases, from
"deficiency payments" to farmers when their income falls below an
agreed parity level. The level of such protection is generally greater in
rich countries than in poor which suggests that the power of the farm
lobby does not fall when the number of farmers declines. Can such a
system be applied internationally to protect the interests of primary
exporting countries?
The system of deficiency payments, which aims at protecting
farmers' income in industrialized countries, has been successfully
transposed from a national to an international context. Under the IMF
compensatory financing facility, balance of payment financing is made
available at low costs when the value of a member's aggregated export
earnings falls below the trend; the member repays when its export
earnings rise above the trend. This facility was widely used in 1976 when
forty-five countries drew a total amount of $2.7 billion. Similarly, under
the STABEX System of the Lomb Convention, countries associated with
the EEC can receive loans or grants when they experience shortfalls in
their export earnings from specified commodities. 2 These two interna-
eighth of it enters the free market; the remaining part is traded under special
arrangements with the United States, the EEC and the U.S.S.R.
2. In the IMF scheme, shortfalls relate to earnings from all merchandise
exports to all destinations. In the EEC scheme, shortfalls relate to earnings
derived from exports of specified commodities to the EEC.
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tional schemes are easy to operate because they are limited to financial
transfers and do not interfere with the markets or any trading arrange-
ments.
Stabilizing world commodity prices is more difficult than administer-
ing an international scheme of compensatory financing. In order to raise
world prices, the international commodity agency has to reduce the
volume of export supplies either by enforcing tighter export quotas, or by
acquiring stocks and withdrawing them temporarily from the market or
by combining both actions. In order to lower prices, the agency can only
release the stocks it had previously acquired. These operations have to be
conducted in accordance with an international commodity agreement
which is an international treaty. Such treaties are not easy to negotiate
since they involve a large number of importing and exporting countries.
EXPORT QUOTAS
To adjust world export supply with world import demand, buffer
stock operations should ideally be combined with the coordination of
national production and investment policies. Because such coordination
is very difficult to achieve, 3 export quotas are used instead as the main
instrument for raising prices in times of commodity surpluses.
A commodity agreement cannot restrict trade among nonmembers of
the agreement, but it can and it has to restrict the quantities that
members can import from nonmembers. Otherwise, exporting countries
would have no incentive to join the agreement since, by remaining
outside, they could benefit from higher prices without having to restrict
the volume of their own exports. Restrictions on imports from non-
members are discriminatory trade practices, but they are considered as
acceptable according to the GATT as long as they are not a vehicle for
unjustifiable discrimination between countries.
During the course of negotiations, one of the most sticky problems
usually deals with the distribution of basic quotas (or market shares)
among exporting countries and the provisions for adjusting them over
time. This was the stumbling block in negotiating the 1977 Sugar
Agreement, and the quota issue was resolved only at the very end of the
sugar negotiation. A line has to be drawn between what should be left
open for later decisions through the commodity council. This can be
illustrated by the provision for adjusting the quotas applicable during the
last three years of the 1977 Sugar Agreement. One solution would have
been to reopen the full negotiation of country quotas after the second year
of the agreement. This solution was rejected because it could have had the
3. Coordination of national production policies has been attempted under the
1971 International Coffee Agreement but the results were not very encouraging.
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effect of reducing the duration of the agreement from five to two years.
This risk was avoided by specifying a fall-back formula for determining
future quotas in the event that the quota renegotiation failed. By taking
into account recent export performances, this formula avoided freezing
market shares among the exporting countries joining the agreement.
The 1977 Sugar Agreement aims at stabilizing prices between eleven
and twenty-one cents per pound and export quotas are enforced only in
the lower part of the range. They are tightened progressively as prices fall
below fourteen or fifteen cents per pound and loosened progressively as
prices return back to fourteen or fifteen cents per pound. Above this level,
exports are not restricted by quotas.
BUFFER STOCKS
Export quotas can be used only to defend the floor price but buffer
stock operations can be used to defend both floor and ceiling prices.
Under the International Tin Agreement, the only one with a buffer stock
history, stocks are internationally owned. Exporting countries contribute
in the form of foreign exchange which is used by the buffer stock
manager to buy tin on the world market. Conversely, in the 1977 Sugar
Agreement, stocks remain owned by exporters but are controlled by the
International Sugar Organization. Members must accumulate minimum
amounts of stocks and hold on to them until the price has reached
nineteen cents per pound. Exporters have to produce certificates of
existence from their government by the end of each month, and
certificates must be verified by on-site inspections at least once a year. On
the basis of the monthly level of stocks thus established, exporters receive
interest-free loans covering the physical cost of storing the sugar. The
loans are extended by a sugar fund receiving the proceeds of a sugar levy
which, ultimately, is paid by both exporters and importers.
4
Whether stocks are nationally or internationally owned, the financial
implications for exporting countries would be the same, provided the
international control of national stocks were tight enough and the
manager of the international buffer stock returns any unused cash
balance to members.5 This was the reason for allowing IMF members to
use the Fund's buffer stock facility on account of cash contributions made
4. The incidence of the levy depends on the relative values of the price
elasticity of the import demand and the export supply.
5. The currencies contributed by exporters return to exporters in the form of
export receipts when the buffer stock manager uses these currencies to buy the
commodity. In the absence of any lag, the effects on the balance of payments of
exporters would be the same whether stocks were nationally or internationally
owned.
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to the tin buffer stock and of sugar stocks held nationally but controlled
by the International Sugar Organization.
The 1976 International Coffee Agreement does not contain any buffer
stock arrangement. Consequently, restricting export supplies by imposing
export quotas implies an increase in the level of stocks held by exporters.
Several exporting countries would like to receive financial assistance for
holding such stocks, and some importing countries consider that the
constitution of reserve stocks when coffee is in surplus would provide a
useful hedge against sharp hikes in time of shortages. Following the peak
of April 1977, coffee prices had already declined by one-third and they are
likely to decline further, provided the Brazilian harvests of 1978 and 1979
are not hampered by frosts. If a coffee surplus were to develop, the 1976
Coffee Agreement might have to be amended along the lines of the 1977
Sugar Agreement so as to include a system of stocks nationally owned
but internationally controlled.
CONCLUSIONS
World prices are of no help in planning investments when they
fluctuate as widely as the prices of coffee and sugar have done during the
last ten years. A major objective of international commodity agreements
is to reduce the amplitude of price fluctuations and to break the
commodity cycles where periods of surpluses alternate with periods of
shortages. Commodity agreements are, unfortunately, difficult to nego-
tiate since they are international treaties among a large number of
importing and exporting countries - many of them with diverging
interests. Moreover, the measures for attaining the stabilization objec-
tives set in the agreement are not foolproof. Prices are today above their
respective ceilings for coffee, cocoa and tin and below the floor for sugar.
So far, it has been possible to stabilize world prices only to a limited
extent and for a limited number of commodities. It seems, therefore,
reasonable to combine price stabilization through commodity agreements
with export earnings stabilization through compensatory financing
schemes which are easier to administer. The countries of the Caribbean
Basin have drawn 268 million Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) under the
Fund's compensatory financing facility during 1976 and 1977. The same
countries may draw up to fifty million SDRs under the Fund's buffer
stock facility on account of their stocking obligations under the 1977
International Sugar Agreement.
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ANNEX
THE IMPORTANCE OF COFFEE AND SUGAR FOR THE
COUNTRIES OF THE CARIBBEAN BASIN
Coffee and sugar together account for over one-half of earnings from
all merchandise exports in the case of four countries of the Caribbean
Basin (the Dominican Republic, Belize, El Salvador and Colombia) and
between one-half and one-quarter in the case of six other countries
(Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Barbados, Costa Rica and Panama). Exports
from the Caribbean Basin represent thirteen percent of world sugar
exports and thirty-one percent of world coffee exports. After petroleum,
coffee is the most important export commodity for developing countries.
World coffee exports reached the record level of $12 billion in 1977, but the
value of world exports of sugar and coffee were about the same in 1976
when sugar prices were at their peak.
Approximately one-half of coffee and sugar exports from the
Caribbean Basin is imported by the United States which has played a key
role in the various multilateral arrangements for these two products. All
producing countries of the Caribbean Basin and the United States have
been members of the International Coffee Organization since 1963. Most
of the sugar from the Caribbean Basin was exported until 1973-74 under
the U.S. Sugar Act or the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement. The latter
was replaced after 1974 by the Sugar Agreement between the EEC and
associated members under the Lom6 Convention. Since the beginning of
1978, the free market for sugar has been regulated by the 1977
International Sugar Agreement with the participation of all countries of
the Caribbean Basin and the United States. Under this Agreement, ten
countries of the Caribbean Basin have minimum stocking obligations
and can make use of the Fund buffer stock facility for a total amount of
up to fifty million SDRs.
